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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
JOHNNY WADE DRAWN,
:

Case No. 890253-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant relies on his opening brief, and refers this
Court to that brief for the statements of jurisdiction, issues,
the case, the facts, and the summary of the argument.

Appellant

responds to the State's answer to the opening brief as follows:
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REACH THE MERITS OF
THE DUE PROCESS AND CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
ISSUES RAISED BY APPELLANT.
The State invites this Court to abstain from reviewing
the propriety of the trial court's actions in admitting the incourt eyewitness identification of Ms. Horn and in admitting the
hearsay statements of Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus through
the testimony of Officer Edwards, indicating that the admission
of the confession allegedly given to Officer Edwards by Appellant
and quoted by Officer Edwards during the trial renders all error
in this case harmless.

1

This Court should reach the merits of

these issues because the method of proof used by Officer Edwards
was unreliable and because the trial court improperly bolstered
1

Respondent's brief 12-16.
1

Officer Edwards1 testimony.
In State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989), the
defendant's confession was recorded in the following manners
At the suppression hearing, the Provo officer
testified that when he interviewed defendant
in Tennessee, he advised defendant of his
Miranda rights and soon obtained a confession
from him. Thereafter, the officer apparently
dictated the confession, stopping after every
few lines to ask defendant whether what was
dictated was accurate. The confession was
then reduced to writing and signed.
Id. at 891.

The court rejected Mr. Carter's claim that the

admission of the confession violated his rights:
After reviewing the record, we are
convinced that there is no proof to support a
determination that any significant item was
omitted from the statement, that defendant's
rights were violated or that he was
prejudiced by the prosecutor's comments. In
fact, defendant's own detailed statements to
two other witnesses immediately after the
crime parallel and substantially support the
confession given to the police. Furthert
defendant signed the document, and he was not
denied a full and fair opportunity to crossexamine the officers concerning the accuracy
of the writing as a reflection of his oral
confession.
Id. at 891.
Before leaving the issue, however, the court was
careful to note the importance of reliable proof of confessions:
While we hold that admission of the
confession was not prejudicial error, we do
not sanction the particular manner in which
it was recorded in this case. In Bishop,
that defendant's confession, together with
statements made by the police officers, was
recorded verbatim. This process not only
helped insure that the defendant's confession
was not coerced, but also provided both the
trial court and this court with the correct
2

tools fo;r effectively and efficiently
reviewing the defendant's contentions, as
well as the totality of the circumstances of
his confession. Such a process guarantees
that constitutional rights are protected and
justice is effected. Nevertheless, while the
dictation process that occurred in this case
could conceivably amount, in other instances,
to deprivation of a defendant's
constitutional rights, that was not the case
here.
Id. at 891.
The method of proof of the confession in the instant
case was far less reliable than that utilized and frowned upon in
Carter.

The alleged confession was not recorded, and Officer

Edwards apparently was not able to find his notes from the
confession (S.H. 17). While the State is willing to saddle
Appellant with responsibility for the lack of a recording by
pointing to Officer Edwards' testimony that Appellant requested
the tape recorder be turned off,

the absence of a recording is

just as easily explained by Appellant's testimony at the
suppression hearing that the confession never took place and that
he never saw or discussed a tape recorder when he was in Officer
Edwards' presence (S.H. 22-23).
Despite the unreliable nature of Officer Edwards'
testimony, the court bolstered it, in telling the jurors to
accept his quotation of Ms. Mar and Ms. Marcellus as fact:
Obviously the testimony that he is
referring to as to that which she said is
hearsay. Prior to this hearing the court has
ruled, however, the unavailability of those
witnesses — there was appropriate effort,
2

Respondent's brief at 26 n.10.
3

the court has found, by the law enforcement
agencies to locate those witnesses which make
it possible that the officer may testify and
you may [ac]cept that as though that witness
were testifying*
(T. 150)
Unfortunately, that was not the only time that the
court gave special protection to Officer Edwards1 testimony.
During Appellant's case, his sister, Audrey Robinson was
testifying concerning a telephone call from Officer Edwards,
during which he represented himself as calling on behalf of
defense counsel, James Valdez.

The court requested and sustained

a hearsay objection.
Q [by Mr. Valdez] Had you told — now,
did you have a conversation with anybody who
may have called you as to the vehicle and who
it belonged to?
A [by Ms. Robinson] No. Two days ago
Detective Edwards called and said he was
calling on your behalf.
Q On my behalf?
A Yeah. And he wanted to know —
Judge Young: Well now, are you just
going to not object to anything these guys
~
say? I mean, this is virtually all hearsay.
Mr. Verhoef: I will, your Honor.
Objection; hearsay.
Judge Young: Sustained.
(T.2 54).
During cross-examination of Ms. Robinson, the
prosecutor was allowed to address a phone conversation between
Officer Edwards and Audrey Robinson without objection from the

3
Utah Rules of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay:
1
"•Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted."
4

court (T.2 56-57).
In light of the fact that the "confession" upon which
the State relies to support the conviction was not reliable and
was improperly bolstered by the court, this Court should not
conclude that the admission of the confession rendered all other
errors harmless.
II. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE INFORMED
OF THE PROPER PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED
IN CONSIDERING THE ADMISSION OF EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY.
During the suppression hearing immediately prior to
trial, and during the trial the court was informed that there had
been two line-ups in this case, without identification of
Appellant (S.H. 3, 32-33; 57). During the trial, Micki Horn was
allowed, over objection, to testify concerning her recognition of
Appellant that apparently happened on the morning of the trial
(T. 57).
In seeking to justify the trial court's admission of
Micki Horn's testimony, the State relies on the deferential
"clear abuse of discretion" standard of review.

That deferential

standard of review is justified by theory that the trial court is
engaged in the context of the trial and is in the best position
to evaluate the ruling.

As explained in Barber v. Calder, 522

P.2d 700 (Utah 1974),
In situations where the exercise of
discretion is appropriate, considerable
weight should be given to the determination
of the trial court, which ever way it goes.
This is true because due to his close
involvement with the parties, the witnesses,
and the total circumstances of the case, he
5

is in the best position to judge what the
interests of justice require in safeguarding
the rights and interests of all parties
concerned.
Id. at 702.
Appellant asserts that in the unique circumstances of
this case, the deferential "clear abuse of discretion" standard
should not apply because the trial court did not have enough
information to exercise his discretion within the bounds of the
law when he ruled the identification testimony admissible.

The

proceedings were as followss
Q Were you in court this morning or see
Mr. Drawn this morning?
A Oh yeah, this morning, yes.
Q And why don't you tell the jurors
about what you observed then.
Mr. Valdez: I am going to object at this
time, your Honor. He's asking for an incourt identification,. There's already been
an objective attempt to make an
identification. That's what a line-up is
for. Now, obviously, Mr. Drawn is the only
defendant here.
Judge Young: Well, your objection has
been heard and is overruled. If she has any
independent recollection she can testify to
it.
Q [by Mr. Verhoef) Would you please
explain to the jury what you observed this
morning?
A Well, when I walked in I sat down and
he turned around and it hit me like a ton of
bricks. I recognized him. And that was it.
And everything about him — the features — I
just . . . it was him. I just couldn't — I
don't know. But I recognized him. The way
he moved, the way his back was over, the
wrinkles on the forehead, his nose,
everything.
(T.57-58).
The admission of this identification testimony came
6

prior to the trial court's making the first requisite finding that the encounter during which Ms. Horn recognized Appellant
was not unduly suggestive.

See State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d 432,

435 (Utah 1989)("First, we must determine whether there was a
pretrial photographic identification procedure used which was so
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.").
While there is no record describing the circumstances
of the encounter (i.e. was Appellant the only black person in the
courtroom, who was Micki Horn with when she saw Appellant and
what did they say to her?), it appears from the transcript of the
suppression hearing held prior to trial that Appellant was
shackled.

4

Also, the specificity and detail provided by Ms.

Horn at trial indicates that her recognition of Appellant was the
product of suggestion, rather than her independent memory of the
robbery.
The trial court did not pause to consider the second
requisite finding - that the identification was the product of
Ms. Horn's memory of the robbery.

See State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d

432, 435 (Utah 1989)("Second, if the photo array is impermissibly
suggestive, then the in-court identification must be based on an
4
See S.H. 8 ("Judge Young: He is certainly going to have
restraints on during the course of the trial.").
5
Compare her testimony at trial that she could recognize
Appellant from the wrinkles on his forehead and his nose (S.H.
58), to her testimony that during the robbery, her assailant was
wearing two nylon stockings over his head (T. 52) and her
testimony indicating she was unable to tell the investigating
officers the race of her assailant (T. 64).
7

untainted, independent foundation to be reliable*")•

Review of

Appellant's discussion of this issue on pages ten through sixteen
in the opening brief demonstrates that even if the trial court
had exercised discretion in admitting the identification
testimony, it would have constituted a clear abuse of discretion.
Inasmuch as the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that
jurors gravitate to eyewitness identification testimony,
regardless of cross-examination and cautionary instructions,
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490-492 and n. 5 (Utah 1986), this
Court should recognize the prejudice caused to Appellant by the
trial court's errors.
III. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S
RIGHTS TO CONFRONTATION AND THE HEARSAY RULE
IN ADMITTING OFFICER EDWARD'S TESTIMONY
"QUOTING" ROSEMARY MAR AND GENORA MARCELLUS.
A. THE STATEMENTS WERE NOT AGAINST INTEREST.
The State maintains that the statements of Rosemary Mar
and Genora Marcellus could have subjected the witnesses to
criminal prosecution, and are thus admissible under Utah Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(3) as statements against interest.'

That rule,

however, does not contemplate that the statement against interest
be made by one with an attorney's appreciation for possible
criminal liability.

Rather, the rule defines a statement against

interest with a reasonable person in mind:
A statement which at the time of its
making so far contrary to the declarant's
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far
tended to subject him to civil or criminal
6

Respondent's brief at 24-25.
8

liability, or to render invalid a claim by
him against another, that a reasonable man in
his position would not have made the
statement unless he believed it to be
true..••
Inasmuch as the statements allegedly made by Rosemary
Mar and Genora Marcellus are exculpatory, it is reasonable to
assume that those witnesses intended and expected the statements
to protect them from, rather than subject them to criminal
liability.
The "statement against interest" exception to the
hearsay rule permits these statements into evidence without the
reliability test of cross-examination because it the prospect of
damage to the declarant caused by the statement is considered a
substitute showing of reliability.
P.2d 270, 273 (1972).

See State v. Sanders, 496

Inasmuch as the statements of Rosemary Mar

and Genora Marcellus are inconsistent descriptions of the same
event,

the reliability that might have been inferred if the

statements had been inculpatory is destroyed.
B. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT SHOWING OF WITNESS UNAVAILABILITY.
In seeking to justify the trial court's admission of
the hearsay statements of Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus
through Officer Edwards, the State points to three exhibits of
"good faith" efforts to secure the presence of Rosemary Mar and
Genora Marcellus at trial: the subpoenas sent out, the telephone
contact with Genora Marcellus1 mother indicating that Genora

7
See Respondent's brief at 25 n.9., detailing the
differences between the statements.
9

would attend the trial, and the State's inability to locate
Rosemary Mar.
The prosecutor in the instant case, who was aware that
Ms. Marcellus8 mother indicated that Ms. Marcellus would attend
the trial, did not expect either Ms. Marcellus or Ms. Mar to obey
the subpoenas.

During the suppression hearing, he stated:

Now, these two ladies were the ones
referred to by Mr. Drawn this morning during
his testimony and I have subpoenaed them
three times to date. All three times they
have failed to appear. And I haven't checked
with my witness office as of 10:00 o'clock
this morning. They should have been there at
9s15. I suspect they're not going to appear.
I have sent Detective Edwards out to try and
track these people down and Detective Edwards
will testify that he made reasonable efforts
to track them down but was unable to contact
them directly, although, a message was left
with the mother of one.
(S.H. 34-35).

Inasmuch as the State made no efforts to secure

the witnesses beyond those that the prosecutor didn't expect to
succeed, characterizing the mailing of the subpoenas and the
contact with Genora Marcellus' mother as "good faith" efforts to
secure the attendance of the witnesses falls flat.

Cf. State v.

Case, 752 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1987)(circumstantial evidence
should have informed the prosecutor that the witness would not
attend, despite assurances to the contrary); State v. Webb, 113
Ut.Adv.Rep. 23, 31 (1989)(court acknowledges that it has given a
strict interpretation to "unavailability precondition."); State
v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119, 1122-1123 (Utah 1982)(prosecution did

8

Respondent's brief at 20-24.
10

not act in good faith, after failing to secure the witness
through the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of Witnesses from
Without a State in Criminal Proceeding when the state was on
notice that the witness was unwilling to appear).
In discussing the efforts of the ubiquitous Officer

9

Edwards" to find Rosemary Mar, the State indicates as follows:
Edwards was unable to locate Ms. Mar at
her home address (its location was found
through use of department informants ), and
had discovered just the day before trial that
she had been going by an assumed name.
Edwards also received information of another
possible address from Salt Lake County
Investigator Steve Bartlett, which also came
up negative when he tried to find Mar (R. 131
at 40).
Testimony at trial showed that Mar
was possibly living in Indiana, but the
address was unknown. (R. 130 at 51).
9
The Officer Edwards on whom the State relied to locate
and secure the attendance of Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus
appears to be the very same Officer Edwards who quoted the oral
statements of those witnesses, who quoted Appellant's statement,
and who called Audrey Robinson on behalf of Defense Counsel,
James Valdez.
10
Compare S.H. 40 ("We, through informants in the police
department and other people, says that's where she's been but we
have been unable to locate her there.").
11
Compare S.H. 40 ("And as of last night, well, late
yesterday afternoon, I found that Ms. Rosemary Mar has been going
by another name."). There is no information about how Officer
Edwards came to know about this name, or about what the name was
(Rose? Mata Hari?).
12
Compare S.H. 40 ("And he gave me the addresses that he
knew and we still came up empty-handed."). There was no
testimony indicating what Officer Edwards did with the addresses
prior to coming up empty handed.
13
Officer Edwards was aware that Rosemary Mar was in
Audrey Robinson's automobile when the robbery occurred (T. 52).
He knew that Rosemary Mar was Appellant's girlfriend and that
Audrey was Appellant's sister (T. 159-160; S.H. 38). Although he
11

Respondent's brief at 20-21.

The State continues in footnote 7

as follows:
Taking into consideration that the
witness could not be located at her home
address, nor at a second address, and was
going under an assumed name* and was facing
possible criminal charges,
it would be
reasonable to assume the witness was
intentionally evading the law.
Respondent's brief at 7.
As demonstrated by footnotes nine through fourteen of
this brief, reference to the transcripts in this case casts the
good faith of the state in seeking to locate Ms. Mar in a
questionable light.
In short, the State did not meet their burden of
demonstrating good faith efforts to obtain the presence of
Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus.

See pages 21-22 of

Appellant's opening brief.
Cc THE STATEMENTS WERE NOT RELIABLE.
The state relies on the interlocking nature of the
statements quoted by Officer Edwards in arguing that the hearsay
statements of Genora Marcellus and Rosemary Mar were reliable.
was able to contact Ms. Robinson by telephone, he never inquired
as to the whereabouts of Ms. Mar (T. 52), apparently preferring
to rely on "informants" and "other people". While Audrey
Robinson indicated that she did not know an address or a phone
number where Ms. Mar, who had called her from Indianapolis, could
be reached (T.2 51, 58), Officer Edwards' failure to inquire
reflects on the quality of his efforts to locate Ms. Mar.
14
Despite diligent efforts, Appellant's counsel is unable
to find a record citation relating to this assertion.
15

Respondent's brief at 24-26.
12

As noted supra, Officer Edwards' method of proof
(quoting statements that were not recorded, and for which he
apparently could not find his notes (S.H. 16-17)) was not
reliable.

See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989).

The

trial court's improper bolstering and protection of Officer
Edwards is further evidence that there is good reason not to
assume that the evidence given from Officer Edwards to the jury
was reliable.

See pages three and four of this brief, supra.

D. THESE VIOLATIONS OF APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO CONFRONTATION WERE
NOT HARMLESS ERROR.
In meeting its burden of proof that these violations of
Appellant's rights to confrontation were harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt,

16

it is not enough for the State to argue that

there is sufficient evidence exclusive of the statements of Ms.
Mar and Ms. Marcellus to support Appellant's convictions.
Because the State deprived Appellant of his rights to confront
those witnesses, the State deprived him of his rights to
demonstrate their lack of credibility, and to gain exculpatory
evidence from them.

As explained by Justice Marshall, dissenting

from a denial of a petition for certiorari in Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986):
The centrality of cross-examination to
the factfinding process makes it particularly
unlikely that an appellate court can
determine that a denial of crossexamination had no effect on the outcome of a
trial.
11
[T]he court ordinarily
cannot measure whether harm has
16

State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 1987).
13

ensued to an appellant when he has
been denied the opportunity to
cross-examine witnesses against
him# given all the risks. Had
cross-examination been allowed,
for example, it might have served
to impeach a witness and thus to
cast doubt on corroborating
testimony, or it might have
elicited exculpatory evidence.
Only on rare occasions will an
appellate court be able to find
that the testimony of the witness
was so tangential, or so well
corroborated, or so clearly
invulnerable to attack that the
denial of the right to crossexamination was harmless." R.
Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless
Error 68-69 (1970).
The fact that a particular witness1 testimony
was corroborated cannot render harmless a
denial of the right to expose his bias.
Defense counsel may have valid strategic
reasons for challenging one witness 1
testimony aggressively while treating a
corroborating witness more gently. Jurors
evaluating the witnesses1 demeanor may choose
to give great weight to the testimony of one
witness while ignoring the similar testimony
of another. In either event, denial of
cross-examination concerning a witness1 bias
may deprive the defense of its best
opportunity to expose genuine flaws in the
prosecution's case - flaws that the cold
record will not reveal to an appellate court.
Indeed, an appellate court attempting to
a
PPly harmless-error analysis is faced with a
formidable burden. The court cannot merely
satisfy itself that the jury would have
reached the same result had the witness in
question not appeared at all; it must be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
jury would have reached the same result even
if cross-examination had led the jury
affirmatively to believe that the witness was
lying. Moreover, the court must conclude,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that no evidence
exculpatory to the defendant could have
emerged from a genuinely adversarial testing
of the witness.
14

Id. at 687-688.
Thus, this Court is faced with the possibility that
cross-examination of Ms. Mar and Ms. Marcellus might not only
have proven them to be dishonest, but also might have provided
Appellant with further evidence with which to impeach Officer
Edwards.

In these circumstances, the violation of Appellant's

rights to confrontation cannot be considered harmless error.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY CONVICTED
AND SENTENCED APPELLANT TWICE FOR THE SAME CRIME.
The gist of the State's argument in support of
Appellant's two consecutive sentences (five years to life for the
armed robbery; five years for the use of a firearm) resulting
from the use of a gun during the robbery is that Utah Code Ann.
section 76-3-203 does not define an offense, but merely enhances
17
Appellant's sentence for the aggravated robbery.
Section 76-3-203, however, does define a crime, and
provides a separate sentence for that crime:
A person who has been convicted of a
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for
an indeterminate term as follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of
the first degree, for a term at not
less than five years, unless
otherwise specifically provided by
law, and which may be for life but
if the trier of fact finds £
firearm or a facsimile or the
representation of a firearm was
used in the commission or
furtherance of the felony, the
court shall additionally sentence
the person convicted for a term of
one year to run consecutively and
17

Respondent's brief at 33.
15

not concurrently; and the court may
additionally sentence the person
convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run
consecutively and not
concurrently*..
Comparison of the firearm statute with the habitual
criminal statute and related case law demonstrates that the
application of the firearm statute in this case violated
Appellant's rights against double jeopardy.

The habitual

criminal statute is provided in Utah Code Ann. section 76-8-1001,
which provides:
Any person who has been twice convicted,
sentenced, and committed for felony offenses
at least one of which offenses having been at
least a felony of the second degree or a
crime which, if committed within this state
would have been a capital felony, felony of
the first degree or felony of second degree,
and was committed to any prison may, upon
conviction of at least a felony of the second
degree committed in this state, other than
murder in the first or second degree, be
determined as a habitual criminal and be
imprisoned in the state prison for from five
years to life.
This statute has consistently withstood constitutional
challenges relating to double jeopardy because it is interpreted
as an enhancement statute - it does not define a crime for which
a punishment is imposed.

As the court explained in State v.

Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 1985),
The habitual criminal statute has
consistently survived constitutional
challenge. State v. Carter, Utah, 578 P.2d
1275, 1277 (1978). The statute "does not
create a new crime; it merely enhances
punishment" for the latest crime in cases
where the defendant has been previously
convicted of and sent to prison for two other
16

felony offenses. JEd. This is consistent
with the purpose of Utah's statute, which is
to "make persistent offenders subject to
greater sanctions." State v. Montague, Utah,
671 P.2d 187, 190 (198TT Further, the
Supreme Court of the United States
"repeatedly has held that increased penalties
for recidivists do not represent punishment
for earlier crimes and therefore do not
violate the prohibitions against double
jeopardy. Rather, the fact of the earlier
crimes aggravates the commission of the
latest crime, warranting the imposition of a
longer sentence." Note, The
Constitutionality of Statutes Permitting
increased Sentences for habitual or Dangerous
Criminals, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 356, 361 n. 29
(1975)(citations omitted).
Id. at 286-287.
Consistent with this enhancement theory, there is no
separate sentence imposed for the habitual criminal conviction.
As the court explained in State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137 (Utah
1989),
This Court has consistently held that "the
[habitual criminal ] statute 'does not create
a new crime; it merely enhances punishment1
for the latest crime." Since no crime
exists, there can be no sentence. Assigning
a separate sentence for recidivism does more
than enhance punishment for the latest crime,
it penalizes an individual for past
convictions.
Id. at 145.
Inasmuch as Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203 provides
explicitly for a separate, consecutive sentence for an actus
reus (use of a firearm) for which Appellant was already convicted
and sentenced (use of a firearm during the commission of the
robbery), the trial court's application of the firearm
"enhancement" statute in this case violated Appellant's rights
17

against double jeopardy.

See Appellant's opening brief at pages

thirty-three to forty-two.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Appellant's conviction rests on unreliable evidence
from two witnesses - Micki Horn, who was improperly allowed to
identify Appellant in court after a presumably suggestive pretrial show up and without independent recollection of her
assailant stemming from the robbery; and Officer Edwards, who was
able to establish the need for his own testimony by demonstrating
the unavailability of Ms. Mar and Ms. Marcellus, and then deliver
his testimony to the jurors, not only unimpeached, but with the
imprimatur of the trial court.
Because the firearm "enhancement" statute imposes a
separate sentence for the crime of using a firearm, the trial
court violated Appellant's rights against Double Jeopardy by
applying that "enhancement" statute to this case, in which
Appellant was already convicted and sentenced for use of a
firearm during the robbery.
Just as clearly as the actions of the trial court
violated Appellant's rights to due process and confrontation, and
against double jeopardy, the actions of the trial court
prejudiced Appellant's case.

Appellant's convictions and

sentences must be reversed.
Respectfully submitted this %
1989.
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STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-203
A person who has been convicted of a
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for
an indeterminate term as follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of
the first degree, for a term at not
less than five years, unless
otherwise specifically provided by
law, and which may be for life but
if the trier of fact finds a
firearm or a facsimile or the
representation of a firearm was
used in the commission or
furtherance of the felony, the
court shall additionally sentence
the person convicted for a term of
one year to run consecutively and
not concurrently; and the court may
additionally sentence the person
convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run
consecutively and not concurrently...
Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery
if in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or a
deadly weapon; or
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon
another.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of
the first degree.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an
act shall be deemed to be "in the course of
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an
attempt to commit, during the commission of,
or in the immediate flight after the attempt
or commission of a robbery.
Utah Code Ann. section 76-8-1001
Any person who has been twice convicted,
sentenced, and committed for felony offenses
at least one of which offenses having been at
least a felony of the second degree or a
crime which, if committed within this state
would have been a capital felony, felony of
the first degree or felony of second degree,

and was committed to any prison may, upon
conviction of at least a felony of the second
degree committed in this state, other than
murder in the first or second degree, be
determined as a habitual criminal and be
imprisoned in the state prison for from five
years to life.
Rule of Evidence 801 defines hearsay as
a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.
Utah Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3),
A statement which was at the time of its
making so far contrary to the declarant's
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far
tended to subject him to civil or criminal
liability, or to render invalid a claim by
him against another, that a reasonable man in
his position would not have made the
statement unless he believed it to be true.
A statement tending to expose the declarant
to criminal liability and offered to
exculpate the accused is not admissible
unless corroborating circumstances clearly
indicate the trustworthiness of the
statement.

